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Abstract
This study aimed to examine the effect of positive and negative feedback on budgetary slack
and the interaction between feedback and self-efficacy on budgetary slack under a condition
of information asymmetry. Preliminary researches have tested various ways of mitigating
budgetary slack practices, which did not separate the effects of positive and negative
feedback. This study hypothesized that positive feedback minimizes the potential for
budgetary slack under conditions of information asymmetry—and vice versa. Additionally,
high self-efficacy reinforces positive feedback in reducing budgetary slack under conditions
of information asymmetry—and vice versa. By employing experimental data, this study
documented the results that positive feedback significantly minimizes (the potential for
budgetary slacking under conditions of information asymmetry—and vice versa. However,
there is no difference in the average budget slack on managers with high or low self-efficacy,
who get positive feedback.
Keywords: budgetary slack, feedback, information asymmetry, self-efficacy
Abstrak
Tujuan penelitian ini adalah menguji pengaruh umpan balik positif dan negatif terhadap
senjangan anggaran serta pengaruh efikasi diri terhadap hubungan keduanya pada kondisi
informasi asimetri. Penelitian terdahulu telah menguji berbagai cara mitigasi praktik
senjangan anggaran, tetapi penelitian tersebut belum memisahkan antara umpan balik positif
dan negatif. Penelitian ini memprediksi umpan balik positif (negatif) akan memperkecil
(memperbesar) potensi senjangan anggaran pada kondisi informasi asimetri, dan efikasi diri
tinggi akan memperkuat umpan balik positif (negatif) dalam mengurangi (meningkatkan)
senjangan anggaran pada kondisi informasi asimetri. Berdasarkan data eksperimen,
penelitian ini mendokumentasikan hasil bahwa umpan balik positif (negatif) dapat secara
signifikan memperkecil (memperbesar) potensi senjangan anggaran pada kondisi informasi
asimetri. Namun, tidak ada perbedaan rata-rata senjangan anggaran pada manajer dengan
efikasi diri tinggi maupun rendah yang mendapatkan umpan balik positif.
Kata kunci: senjangan anggaran, umpan balik, efikasi diri
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INTRODUCTION
Globalization, intense business competition, the rapid development of information
technology, and shorter product life cycles
are some of the factors that transform
business processes. Changes in business
processes will also prompt changes to the
budgeting process (Ahmad et al. 2003),
which play an essential role in organizational
planning and control.
Budget is used as a basis for evaluating
the actual performance of managers
(Anthony and Govindarajan2009). Manager's
achievement on budget targets may tell his
performance. A manager who exceeds their
budget target is usually rewarded with
several forms of compensation to maintain
success. Notwithstanding the incentives,
unethical behavior may also arise if managers
deliberately lower their budget targets to
achieve the target quickly. The practice is
designated as a budgetary slack.
Some factors that promote budgetary
slack are the uncertainty of achieving budget
targets, the desire of managers to control
organizational resources (Nouri 1994), and
the existence of asymmetric information
between superiors and subordinates (Young
1985; Dunk 1993; Faria and Silva 2013).
Budgetary slack may result in the use of
organizational resources to be inefficient and
futile (Yuen 2004).
Budgetary slack is necessary to
investigate as it may be present in all kinds of
organizations. There is always asymmetric
information on subordinates who understand
more about the company's operational
conditions than their superiors (Lau and
Eggleton 2003). Besides, budgetary slack
also has a detrimental effect because the
company must spend excess resources (compensation and other resource allocations) for
the manager who has undermined his actual
production capacity. Budgetary slacking,
especially in the private sector, is interesting
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because there is no transparency in budget
reports; hence it is difficult to detect.
Earlier research has examined ways to
reduce the practice of budgetary slacking
through informal control (Chong and
Ferdiansah 2011; Rodríguez and Naranjo-gil
2016) and formal control (Chen 2012; Yuen
2004). Chong and Ferdiansah (2011);
Rodríguez and Naranjo-gil (2016) employed
informal control of subordinates' trust in
superiors to reduce budgetary slack. Formal
control in the form of rewards and punishments may also reduce budgetary slack
(Chen 2012; and Yuen 2004). Another
effective formal control to reduce budgetary
slack in private information conditions is the
feedback control policy (Chong and
Ferdiansah 2012).
Feedback control policy requires
subordinates to report their budget performance to superiors for evaluation. This
control can reduce information asymmetry
because superiors know their subordinates'
capabilities so that budgetary slacking can be
easily detected. However, previous research
has not distinguished two types of impacts
from feedback, namely, positive and negative
feedback. Positive feedback contains information that shows that someone has
exceeded a goal (Klein 1989) whereas
negative feedback indicates weakness, wrong
response, and failure to achieve goals
(Finkelstein and Fishbach 2012).
Bandura (1989); Mesch et al. (1994);
and Philips et al. (1996) asserted that someone would react to the feedback received; and
that the reaction depends on the desire to
compare the gap between the feedback with
the goals. Besides, the concept of Control
Theory and Self-Efficacy Theory indicates
that each individual's reaction and behavior
to feedback may diverge according to the
type of feedback they receive. In response to
this matter, this study examined two types of
feedback (positive and negative) that have
not been explored by previous researchers.
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Following Social Cognitive Theory,
Wood and Bandura (1989) affirmed that the
gap created by positive and negative feedback could increase or weaken motivation
depending on self-efficacy. Consistent with
this, Chong and Ferdiansah (2012) suggested
that individual behavior is not only
influenced by external factors, but also
internal factors. Individual characteristics
such as self-efficacy is vital predictors of
individual
motivation
and
behavior
(Robertson and Sadri 1993; Nease et al.
1999; Olayiwola 2011).
Self-efficacy is an assessment of an
individual's ability to do something in a
specific condition (Bandura 1977). Selfefficacy is needed in the context of budgetary
slack because individuals assess their ability
to create and achieve budget targets. This
study investigated the self-efficacy variables
that affect the relationship between feedback
(positive and negative) and budgetary slack.
Budgetary slack may arise due to
asymmetric information between superiors
and subordinates. Lau and Eggleton (2003)
affirmed that information symmetry would
not occur under real managerial conditions.
Top management managers might set high
work standards in order to produce higher
productivity (Young 1985). However,
subordinates will downplay their capabilities
if they have private information about
productive capabilities that are not known by
their superiors. The situation indicates that
budgetary slack arises from asymmetric
information so that all hypotheses proposed
are in asymmetric information.
This study is necessary to do for two
reasons. First, feedback types have not been
distinguished in previous studies. Control
Theory and Self-Efficacy Theory states that
each individual's reaction and behavior to
feedback will be different according to the
type of feedback it receives. This study
analyzed the effect of positive and negative
feedback on budgetary slack. Second, a

person's behavior is determined by external
factors (feedback) and is determined by
internal factors within the individual (Chong
and Ferdiansah 2012). As an internal factor,
self-efficacy was examined as in its impact
on the relationship between feedback and
budgetary slack.
Based on experimental data involving
66 undergraduate business students with 2x1
factorial designs between subjects, ANOVA
analysis results showed that positive feedback significantly reduces the potential for
budgetary slack in conditions of asymmetric
information and vice versa. On the other
hand, negative feedback reduces the
budgetary slack's potential for managers with
high self-efficacy. There is no difference in
the average budgetary slack for managers
with high or low self-efficacy who get
positive feedback. The generalization of
these results needs to be arranged carefully
because hypothetical cases, undergraduate
student participants, and the self-efficacy
questionnaire in the experiment may mitigate
the ability to generalize results.
The overall presentation of the results
of this study was organized as follows. The
introduction, literature review and the development of hypotheses, research methods,
and the results and discussion are sequentially discussed. Conclusions, limitations,
and suggestions for further research are
presented at the end of this paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Budgetary
slack
occurs
when
subordinates downplay their productive
capabilities (Young 1985; Kren 2003;
Hobson et al. 2011; Faria and Silva 2013)
meanwhile allowed to determine work
standards that will be used as a basis for
evaluation (Young 1985). Productive
capability is reduced to obtain budget targets
more easily achieved as one intends to
produce monetary rewards (bonuses) and
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non-monetary rewards (Joshi and Abdulla
1996; Douglas and Wier 2000).
Various methods are applied to reduce
productive capability by subordinates, for
example by increasing cost estimates,
reducing income estimates (Anthony and
Govindarajan 2009; Hobson et al. 2011),
reducing the estimated output of production
(Hobson et al. 2011), and reducing the
capability performance (Young 1985; Kren
and Maiga 2007). The difference between
subordinates 'best estimates and budget
targets that are not in line with the subordinates' capabilities is budgetary slack.
Some reasons for managers in making
budgetary slack are to be evaluated positively
(Joshi and Abdulla 1996; Stede 2000),
pressure from superiors to achieve budget
targets (Onsi 1973), the uncertainty of budget
achievement (Onsi 1973; Nouri 1994; Libby
2003), and the desire to control resources
(Lukka 1988; Nouri 1994). Budgetary slack
must be avoided because it causes various
adverse effects, such as not optimal profit.
After all, the cost function is not minimized
(Onsi 1973), company profits are reduced
due to increased costs, compensation and
additional consumption of subordinates
(Fisher et al. 2002), an additional allocation
of resources the fault (Douglas and Wier
2000; Lau and Eggleton 2003), the nonoptimal return on investment (Douglas and
Wier 2000), and resources become useless
and inefficient (Yuen 2004).
Feedback and Budgetary Slack
Feedback is information about the
performance of subordinates that is available
both for superiors and subordinates in their
work environment (Chen and Jones 2004).
Feedback is one of the most critical factors to
improve organizational effectiveness (Lingnan and Leung 2000) because feedback
conveys the compatibility between the nature
and quality of subordinate performance
against the goals to be achieved by the
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organization (Erez 1977; Karl et al. 1993;
Lingnan and Leung 2000; Finkelstein and
Fishback 2012).
Theories that explain how individuals
regulate their behavior according to the
feedback they receive are Control Theory
(Carver and Scheiher 1979, 1990; Mesch et
al. 1994; Klunger and DeNisi 1996; Philips et
al. 1996; Vancouver et al. 2001; Sitzmann
and Yeo 2013) and Self-Efficacy Theory
(Bandura 1977, 1999; Wood and Bandura
1989; Nicklin and William 2011). Control
Theory and Self-Efficacy Theory require
individuals to compare feedback information
and objectives to be achieved in evaluating
performance. Both theories affirm that there
is a mismatch if the feedback does not match
the intended purpose. This mismatch will
impact the sustainability of discrepancy
production and discrepancy reduction, which
play a role in motivation (Philips et al. 1996).
Control Theory emphasizes reducing nonconformities, whereas self-efficacy theory
highlights the sustainability of mismatching.
Positive feedback contains information
that shows that someone has exceeded his
goals (Klein 1989). An individual will further
expand the gap by maximizing the distance
between objectives and standards if there is
positive feedback (Klein 1989). The
individual may try to set goals more than the
standard rather than adjust to the standard or
set goals higher than the previous best
performance (Carver et al. 1979; Philips et al.
1996). Positive feedback, such as the
manager being told that last year's performance was outstanding because it succeeded
in achieving the budget target, is estimated to
play a role in the context of budgetary slack.
Self-Efficacy Theory emphasizes the
sustainability of making a gap when feedback
matches the goals. This theory states that
positive feedback reflects a match between
the feedback and the objectives to be
achieved. This type of feedback may
encourage managers to improve their goals
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and performance by increasing their budget
targets, thus reducing the budgetary slack
possibilities.
Conversely, negative feedback is
characterized by negative information that
contains criticism thrown by superiors to
discourage subordinates who have failed to
achieve their budget targets (Zheng et al.
2013). This type of feedback affects weakness, wrong response, and failure to achieve
goals (Finkelstein and Fishbach 2012). This
type reflected a mismatch between the
feedback with the objectives to be achieved.
Negative feedback affects budgetary slack.
As an illustration, negative feedback happens
when a supervisor told the manager that their
last year's performance was deficient because
they failed to reach the target budget.
According to Control Theory,
individuals will reduce or change previous
reference standards (Mesch et al. 1994),
change behavior, or reject feedback (Klunger
and DeNisi 1996). As a result, the manager
will change or reduce the standard reference
(budget target) before, reject negative
feedback, or change his behavior, leading to
budgetary slacking. Budgetary slack can
occur when managers reject negative
feedback by reducing reference standards
(budget targets).
H1: positive feedback will reduce the
tendency of managers to budgetary
slack rather than negative feedback on
the
condition
of
asymmetric
information.

Feedback and Self-Efficacy
Social Cognitive Theory states that
individuals are operator agents who not only
use brain activity in learning, but also
consider other influences, such as future
actions that are appropriate to the situation,
predict the value to be gained, evaluate the
effects of actions, and make changes if
needed (Bandura 1999). The theory explains
the psychosocial function in the triadic
reciprocal causation model. The model

contains a reciprocal causal relationship
between three factors; namely, the environment can influence cognition, which further
influences behavior (Bandura 1999).
Behavior is an interaction of environmental and cognitive factors. Erez (1977)
also states that the interaction function
between individual factors and the environment is a behavior that is often called as selfefficacy. Feedback can enter into environmental factors and interact with self-efficacy
and further influence the behavior of
budgetary slack. Control Theory emphasizes
reducing the discrepancy between objectives
and negative feedback (Philips et al. 1996),
which might have a different impact on
individuals. Individuals with high selfefficacy are more likely to produce less effort
than individuals with low self-efficacy
(Philips et al. 1996; Sitzmann and Yeo 2013).
The possible reason in that because individuals with high self-efficacy possess more
optimistic perceptions of performance so that
they will reduce effort and time resources
(Carver and Scheier1990; Vancouver et al.
2001, 2002, 2005, 2014; Schmidt and
DeShon 2009).
In the context of budgetary slack,
managers who have high self-efficacy will
reduce their efforts and standards if they get
negative feedback (Klunger and DeNisi
1996) as the perceived gap between the
feedback received and the objectives to be
achieved is getting below the standard. The
individual will reduce his standards and
efforts when getting unpleasant feedback.
The reduction of business standards is made
by lowering an easily attainted budget target;
hence the potential budgetary slack becomes
even more significant.
Self-Efficacy Theory stresses the
sustainability of making a gap when there is
a match between the goal and the feedback it
receives, in this case, positive feedback.
Positive feedback indicates that someone has
reached or exceeded the goal. Individuals
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with high self-efficacy will increasingly
improve their goals and performance when
they receive positive feedback, compared to
individuals with low self-efficacy (Bandura
1977; 1999).
Managers with high self-efficacy will
increase their business if they get positive
feedback as the gap between the feedback
received and the goals are getting smaller.
The manager is more likely to increase his
business by setting higher standards and will
not lower his budget targets. Therefore,
managers with high self-efficacy and get
positive feedback favor to minimize the
potential for budgetary slack. The hypothesis
for testing the interactional impact between
feedback and self-efficacy is as follows.
H2: positive feedback will further reduce
managers' tendency to do budgetary
slack, and negative feedback will
increase managers' tendency to do
budgetary slack for managers with
high self-efficacy than managers with
low self-efficacy of asymmetric
information.

METHODOLOGY
Experiment Design and Participants
Laboratory experimental methods were
conducted to test the hypothesis of this study.
The experimental design used was a factorial
design between 2x1 subjects. Feedback was
manipulated into two conditions: positive and
negative feedback. The self-efficacy variable
was measured using a questionnaire.
Participants in this study were undergraduate business students who have taken
courses in management accounting and
management control systems. Students are
justified to be valid participants as the
assignment of experiments does not require
actual budgeting experience (Chong and
Ferdiansyah 2012). This proxy was a simple
problem-solving assignment that requires
participants to understand budgeting techniques. Besides, the experimental partici-
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pants have the attributes needed to carry out
the experiment protocol; therefore, the
experiment can be carried out (Nahartyo
2013).
Participants acted as counseling
division managers in a company. Participants
who participated in this study were 72
students, and 6 did not pass the manipulation
check. Manipulation checks were carried out
by participants by giving a checkmark (√)
according to the feedback they received. If
there was a statement that the participant
could achieve the budget target last year, then
that participant got positive feedback and
vice versa. Participants who give a checkmark not following the manipulation they
received were considered to have failed this
check. The 66 participants who managed to
escape the manipulation were divided
roughly equally into each group.
The instrument used in this study was
adapted from Chow et al. (1988); Chong and
Ferdiansah (2012) with several changes.
Changes were made by simplifying the
assignment scenario and translating it into the
Indonesian context so that the participating
students more easily understood it. Group
discussions were conducted with several
academics for face validity and content
validity. Besides, a pilot test was conducted
on 38 business students to comprehend the
effectiveness of the manipulation of research
instruments. Focus group discussions and
pilot tests take place before actual experiments were conducted.
Operational Definition and Measurement
The independent variable in this study
is feedback, while the moderating variable is
self-efficacy. Feedback is information about
the performance of subordinates that is
available both for superiors and subordinates.
Feedback is divided into two, namely,
positive and negative feedback. Positive
(negative) feedback was provided by
informing participants that last year they
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showed outstanding performance (or poor) in
achieving budget targets.
Self-efficacy was measured using the
New General Self-Efficacy Scale Instrument
by Chen et al. (2001). This instrument has
high reliability to predict self-efficacy for
different tasks in various contexts (Chen et al.
2001). This instrument has was employed in
various preceding studies (Cowan and Taylor
2015; Maddy III et al. 2015; and Fast et al.
2014). Participants were divided based on
average scores to determine high and low
self-efficacy.
The dependent variable in this study is
budgetary slack. Budgetary slack is the
behavior of subordinates who diminish their
productive capabilities (Young 1985; Kren
2003; Hobson et al. 2011; Faria and Silva
2013) when allowed to determine work
standards that will be used as a basis for
evaluation (Young 1985). Budgetary slack
was measured by the discrepancy between
the participant's best estimate and the budget
collected by the supervisor.
Experimental Procedure
Firstly, participants received three
envelopes containing the assignment
scenario they would do. The first envelope
contained a consent sheet, demographic data,
self-efficacy questionnaire, assignment, and
best target estimation. The second envelope
contained the payment scheme, feedback
treatment, and manipulation checks. The
third envelope contained the participant's
actual assignment that will only be used in
determining participant compensation.
In the initial session, participants
opened the first envelope and were asked to
fill out an agreement sheet containing the
participants' willingness to become research
participants. Then, participants were asked to
fill in demographic data. Participants were
then demanded to fill out a self-efficacy
questionnaire to determine the level of self-

efficacy. Succeeding, each participant performed an actual assignment to find out their
actual capabilities.
All participants were requested to
decode by converting a series of letters into
numbers, for five minutes. The task was a
representation of participants' production
activities and intended to determine the
actual capabilities of their performance.
Afterward, they calculated for themselves of
how much code they translated correctly.
Participants were then ordered to state their
estimated best performance points if they
carry out the next similar assignment.
In the second session, participants
opened the second envelope and explained
the payment scheme they would receive. The
slack-inducing payment scheme was carried
out by paying the basic salary plus a bonus
for each production unit that exceeds the
budget. Participants will continue to receive
Rp20,000 if they cannot reach the budget
target and receive an additional Rp10,000 for
each production unit above the budget target.
This payment scheme is not used as an actual
payment and is only used to internalize the
participants' assignment.
Participants are later given an exercise
to calculate their payment based on the
payment scheme formula to see if they understand the incentive scheme. After an explanation of the incentive payment scheme,
participants were given random positive or
negative feedback treatment. Subsequently,
they are demanded to determine the target
budget that will be collected back to the boss
by considering the incentive payment scheme
and feedback received.
Feedback was provided to all
participants, both in positive and negative
feedback. The feedback provided to all participants requires each production manager to
provide feedback (reports) every three
months, to senior managers based on their
budget performance. As additional information, participants were advised that they
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics
Cell 1 (positive feedback)

Cell 2 (negative feedback)

n = 34
Average = 0.21
Standard deviation = 1.473

n = 32
Average = 1.63
Standars deviation = 2.826

had shown excellent performance (positive
feedback) and terrible (negative feedback) in
achieving budget targets. The statement
indicates that the condition of asymmetric
information that the participant's capabilities
were not exposed to the supervisor. After
composing their budgets, participants were
required to check manipulation questions.
Participants gave a checkmark (√) according
to the feedback they received.
In the last session, participants were
directed to open the third envelope to
complete the code-breaking task for five
minutes. This assignment was a realization of
the participant's work and as a basis for
granting experimental compensation. At the
end of the experiment, participants were
given an explanation of the purpose of the
research and the manipulation provided
(debriefing).
RESEARCH RESULTS AND
DISCUSSION
Data were obtained from 66
respondents who passed the manipulation
check. The participants correctly responded
to the manipulation check questions according to the feedback they received. Six
participants failed the manipulation check as
they responded to positive feedback manipulation when given negative feedback
manipulation, and vice versa.
Before conducting the hypothesis test,
a preliminary test consisting of a randomization test and a test of the influence of
participant characteristics were carried out. A
randomization test was carried out using Chi-

Square. The test results showed that there
were no differences in the characteristics of
participants between each group (Pearson χ2
sex = 9,052; age = 59,264; semester =
11,709). These results indicated that the
randomization carried out is effective.
Alongside, the effect of participant characteristics on budgetary slack was investigated.
ANOVA test results showed that there is no
significant difference in budgetary slack
caused by the characteristics of the participants (F gender = 0.156; age = 0.918;
semester = 0.182).
Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistical results showed
that there are indications of support for all
hypotheses. Negative feedback has an
average value of budgetary slack that is
greater than positive feedback on asymmetric
information conditions. Besides, there is an
indication of support for the second hypothesis that tests the interaction of feedback
and self-efficacy of budgetary slack under
conditions of asymmetric information.
Hypothesis test
Data were analyzed using Two Way
Anova to confirm the effect of each variable
on the dependent variable. The research
hypothesis predicts that positive feedback
decreases the potential for budgetary slack
rather than negative feedback on the
condition of asymmetric information.
The test results showed statistically
significant support for the First Hypothesis (F
= 6.006, p <0.05), which means there is an
effect of feedback on budgetary slack. The
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Table 2
ANOVA Hypothesis Test
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
Feedback
SE
Feedback* SE
Error
Total
Corrected Total

Type III Sum of Squares
65.129a
45.757
27.814
12.632
19.993
287.129
405
352.258

Df
3
1
1
1
1
62
66
65

Mean Square
21.71
45.757
27.814
12.632
19.993
4.631

F
4.688
9.88
6.006
2.728
4.317

Sig
0.005
0.003
0.017
0.104
0.042

R squared = .185 (Adjusted R Squared = .145)

Tabel 3
Independent t-test H1
Slack

Feedback

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

positive
negative

34
32

0.21
1.63

1.473
2.826

average value of budgetary slacking in
participants who received negative feedback
was higher than that of participants who
received positive feedback.
An Independent t-test is employed to
examine whether the average value of
positive and negative feedback is significantly different. The test also showed that
the average budgetary gap of participants
who received negative feedback was higher
and significant (2-tailed) at 0.012 than
participants with positive feedback. The
number implied that budgetary slack between
participants who get positive and negative
feedback was significantly different. These
three results showed that negative feedback
increases manager's tendency to do budgetary
slack than positive feedback on asymmetric
information conditions.
The second hypothesis (H2) predicts
that there is an interaction effect between
feedback and self-efficacy in influencing
budgetary slack. The analysis showed that
there was a significant combined/ interaction
effect between feedback and self-efficacy in
influencing budgetary slack (F = 4.317, p
<0.05). The number implies that positive

Std. Error
Mean
0.253
0.499

Sig (2tailed)
0.012
0.015

feedback will further reduce the tendency of
managers to do budgetary slack, and negative
feedback will further increase the tendency of
managers to do budgetary slack for managers
with high self-efficacy than managers with
low self-efficacy in conditions of asymmetric
information.
Additional
analysis
using
an
independent t-test was used to observe
whether the average value of budgetary slack
in managers with high and low self-efficacy
significantly differed when getting each type
of feedback. Table 4 shows that the average
value of budgetary slack by managers with
high self-efficacy exceeds the average value
of managers with low efficacy when
receiving negative feedback (2.50 and 0.50)
and is significant at 0.045. The number
implies that budgetary slack in participants
with high and low self-efficacy who get
negative feedback is significantly different.
Table 5 shows that the average value of
budgetary slack by managers with high selfefficacy is less than the average value of
managers with low efficacy when receiving
positive feedback (0.07 and 0.30) and is not
significant at 0.663. These results indicatecd
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Table 4
Negative feedback on self-efficacy
Slack

Feedback

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

SE high
SE low

18
14

2.50
0.50

3.502
0.760

Std. Error
Mean
0.825
0.203

Sig (2tailed)
0.045
0.030

Std. Error
Mean
0.165
0.417

Sig (2tailed)
0.663
0.615

Table 5
Positive feedback on self-efficacy
Slack

Feedback

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

SE high
SE low

14
20

0.07
0.30

0.616
1.867

Table 5 shows that the average value of
budgetary slack by managers with high selfefficacy is less than the average value of
managers with low efficacy when receiving
positive feedback (0.07 and 0.30) and is not
significant at 0.663. These results indicate
that budgetary slacking in participants with
high and low self-efficacy who receive
positive feedback does not differ significantly. The various analysis results of the
SPSS output above shows partial support for
the Second Hypothesis.
DISCUSSION
The main consequence of feedback, as
aforementioned, predicts that negative feedback will increase managers' inclination to
create budgetary slack than positive feedback
on the condition of information asymmetry.
The results of statistical tests and additional
analysis have shown support for this
hypothesis. These results are consistent with
the Control Theory and Self-Efficacy
Theory, which asserts that individuals will try
to compare the gap between the feedback
they receive and their goals. The comparison
results in an increase or decrease in performance and goals. Self-Efficacy Theory
reveals the increase in performance and goals
due to the suitability of the feedback (positive
feedback). Conversely, Control Theory

explains the decline in performance and goals
due to mismatched feedback (negative
feedback).
Self-Efficacy Theory affirms that the
suitability of feedback and goals leads to the
sustainability of the gap creation. Sustainability is carried out by increasing performance and goals. Positive feedback is
feedback following individual expectations;
hence the individual will further improve the
performance, goals, and budget targets. The
potential for budgetary slack was proven to
be smaller in positive feedback than negative
feedback because of the correspondence
between feedback and goals; consequently,
managers do not lower their budget targets.
The results of this study are consistent
with and support the results of previous
studies in several contexts. Positive feedback
in the behavioral field can increase employee
commitment and reduce the desire to change
jobs (Belschak and Den Hartog 2009). In the
context of marketing communication to
customers, positive feedback can increase the
commitment of new customers (Finkelstein
and Fishbach 2012).
Control Theory asserts that individuals
will reduce the gap between feedback and the
goals to be achieved by reducing their goals
or standards. Negative feedback creates a
significant gap because it indicates that a
person's performance is below standard. Such
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feedback prompts managers to reduce goals
or standards, namely, budget targets. The
potential for budgetary slack proves to be
higher in this feedback than positive
feedback.
These results are also consistent and
support the results of previous studies.
Feedback is considered a failed experience so
that it can increase anxiety (Daniels and
Larson 2001), reducing positive feelings and
increasing negative feelings (Ilies et al.
2007). As a result, negative feedback can
produce reactions that are the opposite of
what is expected (Brown et al. 2016), such as
decreasing employee commitment and
increasing desire to change jobs (Belschak
and Den Hartog 2009).
The second hypothesis predicts that
self-efficacy variables affect the relationship
between feedback and budgetary slack on
asymmetric information conditions. The
statistical test results showed that the
interaction results between feedback and selfefficacy differ significantly. This indicates
that self-efficacy strengthens the effect of
feedback on budgetary slack.
Additional analysis for the second
hypothesis shows that the average value of
budgetary slack by managers with high selfefficacy exceeds the average value of
managers with low efficacy significantly
when receiving negative feedback (2.50 and
0.50). The study results are in line with the
Control Theory, which stresses reducing
mismatches between goals and feedback
(Philips et al. 1996).
According to Control Theory,
individuals with high self-efficacy produce
less effort than individuals with low selfefficacy (Philips et al. 1996; Sitzmann and
Yeo 2013). The possible explanation is
because individuals with high self-efficacy
feel more optimistic about their performance,
reducing the allocation of business resources
and time (Schmidt and DeShon 2009). In the
context of budgetary slack, managers who

have high self-efficacy are proven to reduce
their efforts and lower their standards when
getting negative feedback (Klunger and
DeNisi 1996)
This finding is in line with research by
Cervone and Wood (1995); and Carver and
Scheier (1990); Vancouver et al. (2001, 2002,
2005, 2014). Participants with high selfefficacy in the Cervone and Wood (1995)
study rated their capabilities too high. The
participant then received negative feedback
and resulted in poor performance. Vancouver
et al. (2001, 2002, 2005, 2014), and Carver
and Scheier (1990) discovered that
individuals who have high self-efficacy
performed worse because they felt that they
had significant progress and reduced their
time and effort.
Subsequent additional analysis for the
second hypothesis shows that the average
value of budgetary slack by managers with
high self-efficacy is less than the average
value of managers with low efficacy when
receiving positive feedback (0.07 and 0.30)
but is not significant. The results of this study
indicate that budgetary slack in participants
with high and low self-efficacy who get
positive feedback does not differ
significantly. The result does not follow the
research hypothesis, which affirms that
positive feedback will further reduce the
potential for budgetary slack on individuals
with high self-efficacy rather than low.
Several reasons could explain the insignificance of a part of the second hypothesis.
One source that forms self-efficacy
beliefs is the achievement of past
performance (Bandura 1977). Experiences
that show success (positive feedback) will
increase individual confidence. The statement is supported by Karl et al. (1993);
Reynolds (2005); and Achterkamp et al.
(2015), who found that positive feedback
significantly improved a person's selfefficacy. Individuals who previously had low
self-efficacy are more likely to increase their
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self-efficacy when getting positive feedback.
Positive feedback may increase an individual's self-confidence. As a result, the
individual believes that he can achieve the
budget target, so as not to reduce the budget
target to be achieved. The potential for
budgetary slack in individuals with low selfefficacy when getting positive feedback will
be lower. This explanation answers why
budgetary slacking is not significantly
different for participants with high and low
self-efficacy who get positive feedback.
Individuals with low self-efficacy also
show two reactions when given positive
feedback (Hattie and Timperley 2007). The
first reaction is that the individual will
improve his performance to avoid failure so
that he will not lower the budget target. The
second reaction is that the individual will
avoid positive feedback because he feels that
he has had enough success and to avoid
further risk. Avoidance of positive feedback
was seen through research data, which
explicated that most participants equated
their budget targets with their best estimates.
The research data revealed that 23
participants received positive feedback manipulation and made the budget target the same
as the best estimate. This amount was far
more than that of participants who lowered
their budget targets (7 participants) and those
who increased their budget targets (4
participants). Details of 23 participants are 12
participants who had high self-efficacy and
11 participants who had low self-efficacy.
This second reason induces the average
budgetary slack of participants with high and
low self-efficacy who get positive feedback
manipulation is not significantly different.
CONCLUSION
This study aimed to examine the effect
of positive and negative feedback on
budgetary slack, with self-efficacy as a
moderating variable. The results showed that

129

negative feedback increases budget slack
rather than positive feedback. According to
Control Theory, reducing the gap between
feedback and standards/objectives may be
performed by reducing individual effort
rather than increasing performance. Negative
feedback originates the gap between feedback and goals wider hence an individual
might further reduce his efforts; in other
words, budgetary gap high possibly occurs.
Self-Efficacy Theory asserts that if
there is a gap between feedback that is equal
or exceeds the objectives, individuals will be
more motivated to improve their performance. Positive feedback indicates that
individual performance exceeds the standard.
The condition induces individuals not to
reduce their budget targets because they
incline to improve their performance; hence
the potential for budgetary slacking is
smaller.
The potential for budgetary slack will
be higher if individuals who get negative
feedback are individuals with high selfefficacy. Control Theory emphasizes reducing the gap between feedback and standards/
objectives in reducing the gap. Individuals
with high self-efficacy tend to reduce their
efforts because they feel more optimistic
about their performance, therefore reducing
time and effort. Individuals with high
efficacy may further reduce their efforts
when receiving negative feedback as the gap
between feedback and the goal is getting
bigger.
Notwithstanding low or high selfefficacy, budgetary slacking in individuals
does not significantly vary when receiving
positive feedback. Positive feedback can
increase individual confidence, even in
individuals with low self-efficacy. An individual will experience an increase in selfconfidence not to shrink the budget target so
that it can be easily achieved. This condition
explains why budgetary slack does not
deviate significantly in participants with high
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and low self-efficacy who get positive
feedback.
This research may still have an external
validity since it was conducted by the
experimental method. The use of hypothetical cases and student participants in
experiments also potentially lessens the
ability to generalize research results in
different situations or real business practice
situations. The manipulation test that has
been done in this research is expected to be
able to mitigate this weakness. Besides, the
use of questionnaires that have been
developed in studies of different cultural
contexts in the measurement of self-efficacy
in this study can bring up the potential for
measurement bias. However, the questionnaire has been tested in various previous
studies.
The threat of experimental research,
such as history and maturation, is possible.
History could appear when subjects are
placed at different times during the
experiment. The hole can be avoided by
researchers by doing all stages of the study
before the lecture begins. Maturation could
also occur when a subject is exhausted. The
condition might affect the results of an
experiment. The experiment, which takes a
maximum of 15 minutes, is expected to
reduce these weaknesses.
It was suggested that future studies
manipulate rather than measure self-efficacy
variables to reduce the potential for
measurement bias. Another way is by
applying the self-efficacy variable as a
mediating variable using Social Cognitive
Theory. This theory affirms that one source
of self-efficacy is prior experience (Bandura
1977). The previous successful experience
might increase self-efficacy, and vice versa.
The application of business practitioners'
experimental participants might also be
carried out to evaluate and improve the
generalization of the study's results.
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